It has become known, according to local and regional media sources, that the war in Sudan began with a military coup instigated by some political parties forming the “CDCF” (Coordination of Democratic Civil Forces) group, which directed the Rapid Support Forces militia. The plan was to seize power with a swift and decisive strike, impose the Framework Agreement, restructure the army, and crush the Islamists. According to the “Sudan Now” news network, Sadiq Farouk Al-Tom, a leader of the Sudanese Communist Party within the Forces of Freedom and Change coalition, said: “The battle with the Islamists (the Kizan) has reached zero limits—either we crush them or we prepare to ascend their gallows.” The army was able to thwart the coup plan, and the country was plunged into war.
All this talk and statements related to the reasons for the war, the question of who fired the first shot, who created the atmosphere that dragged the country into war, and who made the coup the only option when discussing alternative paths in the event that any of the political forces or the army blocked the approval of the Framework Agreement—these are matters for the law and state courts, with no leniency for anyone. This time, the people will stand to hear and see who plunged them into this inferno, where they lost precious lives, security, savings, and honor. There will be no forgiveness, no “let bygones be bygones,” and no political settlements like those previous governments and regimes used to close cases. Until then, it is essential for “CDCF” to seek a new approach to re-engage internally, far from the bullying of opposing political forces, and reconcile with the Sudanese people. The current time is the most suitable for achieving this, as the Sudanese people at this stage prioritize unity above all else. Later, accountability for all will be necessary.
“CDCF” must understand that regaining public trust requires distancing itself from supporting militias or aligning with them. It should not rely on regional or international interventions in the country’s internal affairs, as this may lead to further division. Likewise, “CDCF” should avoid relying on regional or international sponsorship for its secular political project. It must also not delude itself into thinking that exporting certain Arab political models or other regional experiences—based on external guardianship or influence-sharing among political parties and entities—can work in Sudan. Sudan is entirely different from many countries where internal political interference and national sovereignty were compromised.
Now is the time for true patriots to focus on the homeland, which is possible. Delays make it difficult, perhaps impossible. Thus, “CDCF” must reassess its exclusionary and coup-driven projects that aim to control the country’s destiny without electoral legitimacy, as this is a thing of the past. There is no revolutionary legitimacy after the war. They must forget the words of Al-Rasheed Saeed, a leader in the Sudanese Professionals Association, who told a French channel that the revolution in Sudan, unlike the Arab Spring countries, was against the Islamists and that it signifies rejecting the religious state in favor of the secular state. Such exclusionary, nihilistic rhetoric does not lead to sound political practice nor can it contribute to political stability or social progress.
In contrast, the rhetoric of the Islamists has seemed more consistent with democratic values and requirements. Amin Hassan Omar, a leader of the broader Islamic movement, said in a talk show: “Our political project is not against anyone, and no one has the right to deny us our political rights under any banner or title.” He added that their support for Hamdok’s government was not out of love for him but out of love for their country and fear of it descending into chaos. Therefore, they support the transitional period. Ibrahim Ghandour, president of the National Congress Party, confirmed this in his first press statement after their regime fell, saying: “We will be a supportive opposition for stability, and we will await the elections after reassessing our experience.” Thus, the Islamists must indeed hasten to evaluate their experience and develop new approaches that align Sudan’s internal political reality with the regional and international environment, emphasizing the importance of escaping the country’s civilizational and political impasse. They reaffirmed that the Sudanese people have deep-rooted attachment to religious values and principles.
Efforts must therefore be made in this direction to ensure the return of security, stability, and peace to our country, given the army’s advances on all fronts to regain control and restore security and peace.
We must recognize that Sudan is rich in its diversity, and peace and stability strategies must be built on comprehensive dialogue and genuine partnership with all segments of society. Moreover, it is essential to focus on enhancing national sovereignty and building strong state institutions that reflect the will of the people and meet their needs. To stop the war and achieve lasting peace, all Sudanese political parties should adopt initiatives aimed at national reconciliation and creating a safe environment for everyone, while emphasizing the importance of human rights, social justice, and the rule of law.
Based on this, we can lay the foundation for a secure and stable future for Sudan, one that transcends the current crises and fulfills the aspirations of all Sudanese. Therefore, the face of truth remains: for Sudanese parties to present themselves anew to the people, they must reconsider reconciliation with the Sudanese people, apologize for this war, and agree among themselves on a national initiative to end the conflict. It is also important to recognize that the army’s victory is a step toward peace, while a militia victory widens the scope of war and conflict. Furthermore, the Jeddah Agreement must be considered as the key to ending the crisis and the main and only way to end the war through dialogue. In this way, Sudan can move to the next day without zero-sum conflicts.
Best regards.
Saturday, October 19, 2024
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